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Abstract : 
This paper develops the foundations of a model for time representation in the 
framework of a man-machine dialogue system. While we analyse other approaches, 
especially Allen's interval calculus, we show how the relations that we commonly 
manipulate in everyday reasoning can in fact be reduced to two fondamental ones : 
succession and inclusion. By the way, we insist on the fact that a temporal model 
intended to reproduce some features of the human cognitive abilities shall include in a 
common representation linguistic information and conceptual objects. 
We then present the main characteristics of our temporal model, introducing the 
concept of coherence zone, and how this one can be used to represent tense information in 
natural language. Finally, we briefly show the mechanisms that ensure temporal 
consistency when combining new temporal information to an existing structure, and 
present the main elements that allow learning and predicting mechanisms within this 
model. 
Area of reviewing: (B3) cognitive modeling. 
This paper has not been submitted to any other major conference in 1989. 
1. Introduction. 
Time has gained more and more importance in recent years research in Artificial 
Intelligence for it is the keystone of any system reasoning on a universe of moving objects 
or trying to understand natural language in a man-machine interaction for example. 
However, dealing with assembly lines or computer operating systems, which are rather 
deterministic, is not the same problem as conversing with a human being with all his 
uncertainties and inconsistencies. In an application such as administrative database 
questioning, where a potential user should not be told how to make the system work, any 
step of the interaction must be as natural as possible, especially when dealing with facts 
and events that the speaker easily handles. This points out the need for a model of time 
representation and reasoning that is not a mere instant or even interval calculus, but 
becomes part of a common representation of language and cognition. 
Such models cannot be found in logical approaches as proposed by McDermott 
([McDermott 82]) or Shoham ([Shohairn 87]), which are based upon a formal system, too 
rigid and constraining to deal with commonsense reasoning, even if successive 
improvements finally solve some problems, such as non-monotonicity or persistence. As 
alternatives, many studies have been made within the scope of cognitive sciences, 
proposing new visions for knowledge representation and time understanding. Those 
rough models need to be revised in order to be implemented, but none of them shall be 
rejected without a real study of its possible contribution to the comprehension of 
cognition. For instance, in the early forties, Jean Piaget showed that the comprehension of 
time among young children, trying to recall an experience of emptying and filling water 
jugs, is essentially based on two aspects, namely, the succession of events, which lies at 
the root of the mechanism of causation, and the variable granularity of the analysis that can 
be made of a particular event, which appears to be split up, if the context requires it. 
Beside this psychological approach, linguistics has endeavoured to explain the 
mechanisms that ensure the coherence of the tense system in many different languages. 
Here the problem is to link an utterance with the situation it describes, taking into account 
the specificity of aspect and modality which are crucial in speech communication. 
The work presented here is an attempt to make a synthesis of these rather different 
trends, in order to propose a cognitive model of time representation that is both natural and 
computationaly acceptable. We will first show the important work made by Allen to take 
into account the relative and hierarchic aspect of time in everyday use, and how his 
temporal relations can be put together in three homogeneous classes. Comparing this 
model with Hornstein's representation of tense, Yip yields some clues to a possible 
integrated notion of language and knowledge representation based on time. We shall then 
present a model that, we argue, can represent most problems bound to tense and aspect, 
but, over all, it seems an interesting way to explain some cognitive phenomena and 
implement them, particularly in the case of learning and predicting mechanisms. 
2. Towards a unified vision of language and representation. 
It is generally admitted that numbers are not a good tool for locating a situation in the 
course of time, since it gives at any moment a infinite precision and therefore makes it 
difficult to structure a space of events in a coherent way. Dealing with instantaneous 
objects or manipulating intervals with numerical boundaries lead to the same problem of 
determining those values which are typically unknown, or correspond to some other brief 
events whose location is not accessible either. The solution is then to consider the relations 
that several events establish with each other, that is, to deal with a temporal graph, rather 
than to try to situate those events precisely on a date line. 
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2.1 An advanced vision of time : Allen's intervals calculus. 
Allen ([Allen 83]) develops a theory of time based on intervals between which thirteen 
different relations can hold (see figure 1). These relations represent the exhaustive links 
that may appear without considering whether those intervals are taken or not with their 
boundaries as would be the case when dealing with real dates. Allen proposes some 
algorithms in order to compute temporal constraints among a set of intervals, so that new 
information are easily integrated in an existing graph. 
R e l a t i o n 
X before Y 
S y m b o l 
< 
Symbol 
for Inverse 
> 
E x a m p l e 
XXX YYY 
X equal Y = = XXX 
YYY 
X meets Y m mi XXXYYY 
X overlaps Y 0 oi XXX 
YYY 
X during Y d di XXX 
YYYYY 
X starts Y s si XXX 
YYYYY 
X finishes Y f f i XXX 
YYYYY 
Table 2.1 (from [Allen 83]). 
However, it seems that he has not completely broken off with the traditional vision of 
time, as many of his relations present some redundancies, even if he sometimes introduces 
the relation m(il, i2) equivalent to {starts( i l , i2) or during( i l , i2) or finis hes(il, i2)}, as a 
short cut when dealing with linguistic information. We can, in fact, display three main 
categories of relations in which we may classify Allen's : 
- Succession, in which we can include before and meets . 
- Inclusion, the one introduced by Allen for starts, during, finishes , to which we can 
add equal. 
- Overlaps, which cannot be categorized in any of the preceeding classes. 
The first two classes appear when trying to specify the exact difference between, for 
example, before and meets. Apart from the case when you have to exactly synchronise 
two processes, it seems impossible to express that two events stricly meet. Their 
respective end and beginning may have occured in a very tight space of time, but at the 
perception level, you cannot be sure of their exact concomitance. One way of experiencing 
this phenomenon is to imagine two events that seem to meet, let's say pushing a button 
and making an alarm ring. If you try to verify that these two events are adjacent, you can 
only explore the beginnings and ends of both to localize the very moments during which 
they happened. In fact, the same problem could be put forward for starts, during and 
finishes. Therefore, we may wonder if we shall distinguish those relations which cannot 
be easily differentiated. In the context of a dialogue between a man and a machine this 
seems all the more obvious, since we manipulate information that only come from natural 
language and thus, apart from the case when a date is explicitely mentioned, time is 
essentially seen as a set of situations upon which language only gives relative orders. So, 
shall we offer a precision to the user that he cannot even perceive? 
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The last relation, overlaps, is puzzling for several reasons. Unlike the others, it is not 
transitive (inside one single class of relations), and is difficult to perceive in a cognitive 
point of view. As a matter of fact, when you recall two events that overlap, you situate 
them by showing the very part common to both. You may mention the begining of one of 
them in relation to the end of the other, but in any case, it is necessary to go deeper in the 
micro-structure of each event to explain this relation. In a first analysis, then, it is not 
obvious that this relation is fondamental when one deals with time representation. 
2.2 The need for tense interpretation. 
Since the only source of temporal information in a dialogue comes from the utterances 
produced by the speaker, a system for reasoning about time shall include a tense 
interpreter. Hornstein ([Hornstein 81]) established the base for such a module, as he 
showed that, with three temporal points, namely S (the moment of speech), R (a temporal 
reference) and E (the situation discribed by the utterance), it was possible to construct a 
formula describing a combination of a matrix proposition, deictics and adverbial phrases. 
To locate these three moments, he introduces two relations, one that situates a point before 
the other, and another indicating an ordered proximity (symbolized respectively by '_' and 
',') For example, the simple past can be represented by the sequence : E,R_S. 
Two main critics can be made to this model of tense representation : First, it is difficult 
to give a clear meaning to the reference point as an actual temporal object In fact, it seems 
that, before all, it is used as a tool for making inferences rather than as a real object. The 
second point is the relation of association between two time points which leads to some 
problems when combining several clauses [Yip 85], for it is not commutative, and it 
expresses a kind of precedence relation. Since this relation can be understood at a 
linguistic level to be important for being able to represent tense information, it is necessary 
to define it in another way, so that it will be possible to deal without any problem with 
such difficult things as the present tense (especially in french and other languages where 
no progressive form exists) which expresses situations in the near past as well as in the 
future. Finally, Horstein's model is of conceptual importance, especially because it 
integrates the time of the utterance and the temporal meaning of this one into a single 
representation. 
2.3 An attempt to combine time, tense and aspect. 
As he analyses Hornstein's model for tense representation, Yip interprets it in relation 
to the interval calculus of Allen. To each sequence of the three points E, R and S he 
associates a graph of temporal relations between intervals representing those points. Since 
he reduces his temporal objects to instantaneous intervals, Yip obtains a simplified model 
to explain each constraint showed by Hornstein for combining utterances. For instance, 
the diagram obtained for the simple past is as follows : 
Yip thus gives a vision of a temporal model for representing tense information that is 
not essentially based on natural language properties. As a matter of fact, this can be seen 
as a step towards a cognitive model of time which, if needed, can take into account 
information taken out of utterances. These principles lie at the root of our temporal model, 
of which we now present the main characteristics. 
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3. A simplified model of time interpretation. 
We propose a model based on few relations and concepts that can however represent 
most phenomena bound to the design of a man-machine dialogue system. After defining 
the principal objects that we manipulate, we present the fondamental scheme of analysis 
based on coherence zones. These zones enable the model to deal with multiple input of 
information and to analyse utterances of a dialogue as objects among others in the system. 
Some examples of representation will be taken in the field of natural language 
understanding. In section 4, we will see how this model leads to a general analysis of 
temporal learning which is an important point for the understanding of causation. 
3.1 The concept of temporal zone. 
We will call a temporal zone an object representing a situation that develops along the 
time dimension. This object is either an elementary zone, we might say a perception such 
as a phoneme, if we consider it as the finest granularity in a speech understanding system, 
or a more complicated one that can be defined in several ways. First, it may inherit from a 
more general class of zones. For example, the temporal zone representing a particular 
monday may inherit from the object that refers to all the mondays (all that can be called a 
monday). A temporal zone can also be defined, like in Allen's model, by the relations it 
establishes with other zones. For example, the day we were just speaking about can be 
defined approximatively as being the zone following the proceeding Sunday. 
What is the origin of such zones? Two main sources can be observed from an 
understanding system point of view. A zone can be generated from the system's own 
subjective experience as a set of coherent data. For example, if it is connected to a vision 
system, a sequence of images of an object passing through its vision field can make a zone 
to be created. Even if the system is blind, a dialogue gives several levels along which 
temporal zones can be created. A word, a sentence, any sub-dialogue in the main dialogue 
course are coherent temporal zones that can appear in the representation space of a system. 
The other kind of zone that can be created comes from the understanding of utterances, to 
which elements of representation can be associated. For example, to the expression 
"yesterday" we can associate the zone representing the day before that of the utterance. 
The important point bound to the concept of zone is that time is not a dimension 
superimposed to a particular situation, but this latter is actually defined by a zone in a 
temporal point of view. As a consequence, no difference is made a priori between 
discourse elements (phonemes, words, structures...) and conceptual information 
(processes, states...) for their representation as temporal zones. 
3.2 Relations between zones. 
3.2.1 Inheritance. 
As we have seen it in the previous section, a zone may inherit some of its temporal 
properties from one or several other zones. The kind of relation thus defined allows the 
making of abstractions among zones that share common links. For example, syntactic 
structures can be seen as general relationships between classes of zones such as words or 
syntagmatic groups. We will see in section 4.2 how the inheritance relation lies at the root 
of the mechanism of comprehension. 
3.2.2 Temporal relations. 
We have seen that Allen's relations among intervals could be categorized in three main 
classes. In fact, we explained why we don't consider the overlaps relation as beeing 
fondamental in a cognitive point of view. Thus we shall define only two temporal relations 
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between zones, namely succession (prec(Zonel,Zone2) <-> 'zonel precedes zone2') and 
inclusion (in(Zonel,Zone2) <-> 'zonel is in zone2'). As we have mentioned it earlier, 
these relations are close to the mechanisms observed in human behavior, especially as they 
only define relative links between two situations to be studied. We will sketch those 
relations, the inheritance one and their inverses with the following figures : 
I zone2 „ v I ™ne'2 I 
| zonel | |zonel | 
in(zonel,zone2) prec(zonel,zone2) inherits(zonel,zone2) 
or in_i(zone2,zonel) or prec_i(zone2,zonel) or inherits_i(zone2,zonel) 
As an illustration, we can represent an extended situation where two zones Z1 and Z2 
overlap, by stipulating a third zone Z3 that is included in both as follows : 
The succession relation presupposes no range of distance between the two related 
zones. They can either be very close as in the case of two words in a single utterance, or 
separated by centuries when dealing with historical events. It only indicates that the 
information which specifies the location of a zone relatively to another has been 
considered by the system as being noticeable, either for causation reasons, or simply, 
because the sequence is recurrently met by the system. 
The inclusion relation is complementary to the preceeding one, for it gives the 
possibility of analysing any situation with a finer granularity, thanks to a set of zones to 
which it is related. This relation is not a simple temporal inclusion between two zones 
indicating that one situation occured during another, but it may express the fact that an 
event is a component of another. Let's take an example : when you assert "Yesterday, I 
walked all day", you refer to a situation of walking the day before today. Still, you may 
have not actually walked all day, but you stopped to refresh yourself or to observe 
flowers. This situation is schematized by the following figure where zones are labelled by 
the discourse elements by which they are refered to: 
| yesterday | 
[ walking all day [ 
r 
[observing flowers | 
The action 'observing flowers' doesn't prevent you from saying that you walked all 
day. But, if you need to describe your wander at a lower level, you will have to mention 
it. Thus, reasoning about time requires such variable depth description of situations, 
whereas usual logical systems consider all events at the same level. 
3.3 Associating intervals : the coherence zones. 
We introduce here a way of seeing zones, not as simple time intervals, but as elements 
of analysis in a reasoning system. As a matter of fact, when you face several situations 
that appear in the same period, you feel some difficulties to locate them, unless you go 
into a precise study of these situations. At a high level of consideration, you can only say 
that they belong to a common temporal zone, which we will call a coherence zone. For 
example, consider the situation when you are under a stormy sky and you see a flash of 
lightning in front of you. By the same time, you hear a loud sound reaching your 
attention. As they are nearly simultaneous, these two events can be joined under a single 
zone : 
"coherence zone" 
"visual zone" "auditive zone" 
As an extension, two situations, not necessarily being in close temporal relation, can be 
linked, as soon as they are recognised as making a coherent whole. If you are far enough 
from the place where the lightning struck the ground, you may hear the sound after having 
seen it. Thus, some temporal relations may appear in the coherence zone that we have 
drawn: 
This corresponds to the general link that we could make between one concept and 
another which indicates it, that is a sign and its signification. A coherence zone is 
this association along a temporal scale, learned thanks to the system's experience. A 
special case of such a situation is the analysis of language, which can be seen as the 
association into a same coherence zone of a part of a linguistic exchange (a dialogue, a 
sentence, a word or even a phoneme) and a representation of its temporal meaning. We 
will see in the next section how this can be applied to actual cases. 
3.4 Time representation in natural language. 
Temporal information appear at different levels in a single utterance. Roughly, we can 
distinguish two kinds of elements that can produce such information. First, we observe 
locutions that refer to actual temporal zones, either in a lexicalized form as "yesterday", or 
when a predicate is mentionned which indicates the temporal zone along which it is valid. 
For example, to the utterance "Leon sang" we associate, through a coherence zone, the 
temporal zone that bears the predicate 'sing(Leon)': 
The second kind of information yields the relationships that generated temporal zones 
set up with the time of the utterance. Typically, tense markers specify the relative 
precedence between the predicate corresponding to the marked verb and the utterance. 
Thus, for the proceeding example, we have : 
I sing(LeonJ 
A special case of this is the simple present in french, german or japanese, which points 
out no exact temporal relationship between the utterance and the situation described. It can 
be easily represented thanks to a coherence zone that simply indicates that the two events 
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appear in a same situation. Afterwards, contextual information may be instanciated to 
precise this relationship. 
At that point, a notion has to be mentioned which concerns the progressive aspect that 
is directly marked in English, but only appears in the french tense 'imparfait'. As the 
progressive form expresses the angle under which you look at a particular event, namely 
inside this event, it can be represented by the inclusion of a temporal zone in the predicated 
one. For instance, "Leon was singing" is represented by : 
The dotted zone (we will call it an attention zone) expresses the fact that the system is 
waiting for something to happen at the place of this very zone. This means that "Leon was 
singing" must be followed by something like "...when May entered the room", whereas 
this was not the case in "Leon sang", which is an homogeneous sentence. We observe 
here that the temporal succession does not appear between the utterance and the predicate 
directly. As a matter of fact, the event 'sing(Leon)' may finish far after the time of the 
utterance. 
The origin of the attention zone in the preceeding example is a particular case of the 
general mechanism of instanciation within zones. As a temporal zone inherits relationnal 
properties from its ancestors, if one of them establishes a link with a particular zone, this 
latter is instanciated in the same operation. For example, when you instanciate the zone 
refered to by "yesterday" (labelled 'yesterday'), you usually attach to it the zone 
corresponding to the current day (labelled 'today'), where the utterance finds itself. This is 
shown in the following figure, in which we find again an attention zone since "yesterday" 
expresses a context where an event is to happen. 
Finally, we show the representation obtained for the whole sentence : "Yesterday, 
Leon was singing when May entered the room", in which we have removed the coherence 
zones to clarify the drawing. Moreover, each attention zone that we have mentionned for 
sub-parts of this sentence has been supplied with other zones to take their place. Thus, the 
sentence is wholly interpreted. With the mechanisms that we will show in the next section, 
we see that it is possible to infer, in this sentence, that the action : 'sing(Leon)' ends 
before the time of the utterance. 
reference zone 
| "yesterday"] 
I YbS'l'tiRpAV 1 |"TODaY1 general classes 
utterance 
1 
4. Operations on temporal zones. 
After having shown how it was possible to represent time information thanks to our 
temporal zones, it is important to draw the main lines of the kind of inferences that can be 
done within this model. Two kinds of operations can be distinguished. Those concerning 
temporal relations right away and assuring that no contradiction exists in the system, and 
the operations manipulating zones along the hierarchy built by the inheritance relation. 
4.1 Temporal coherence. 
> 
A contradiction between two incompatible relations can appear in our model when two 
zones are instanciated to build a new one, preserving the previous relations that each were 
holding before. As only one relation among the four that we have introduced can exist at a 
time between two zones, the presence of a contradiction can be detected by propagating 
the constraints along the intervals until such an incompatible couple of relations is met. 
For example, the interpretation of the sentence "Yesterday, May will enter the room" shall 
lead to an inconsistency as shown in thé following figure : 
| yesterday | | today | 
A mechanism similar to Allen's is started at that moment to propagate constraints in the 
candidate for instantiation. However, some fondamental differences exist between the two 
methods. First, we can see that the reduced set of relations that we manipulate shortens 
drastically the number of computations that has to be done. We can sketch the associations 
that can be inferred from two relations rl and r2 linking three zones a, b and c thanks to 
figure 2, close to Allen's table of transitivity relationships. 
a i T I ^ ^ 
prec precj in in_i 
prec prec no info {prec.in} (1) prec 
prcci no info prec i {prec_i,in} (2) prec i 
in prec prec i in no info 
in_i {prec,in_i} (3) {prec_i,in_i} (4) (in,inj} (5) inj 
Table 4.1, possible deductions for two relations rl and r2. 
The numbered inferences are ambiguous (cf Appendix). 
If a relation can be inferred, it is propagated, and the computation goes on. When no 
information is given by the couple of relation, then we do nothing, since no constraint has 
appeared. In the last case, a subset of the available relations is put forward. However, 
why shall we infer one or onother, since the two graphs we would thus obtain, would 
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correspond to two completely different visions of the world described ? In fact, it turns 
out that if, through the course of computation, a relation appears that is not compatible 
with the restricted set, the following inferences will exhibit the contradiction further 
between two nodes (the complete proof of this last point may be seen in the appendix). So 
very few computations are necessary, and it allows quick verification of the possible 
associations of two sub-graphs of temporal zones. 
4.2 Learning and Predicting. 
We have seen that the hierarchy of temporal zones could provide us with general 
classes of zones that act as templates for their lineage. The generation of zones along the 
inheritance relations is based on one fondamental mechanism, that is, unification of 
temporal zones. As two zones are given, this unification tries to superimpose them, as 
well as the relations they keep up. The successive neighbours of the zones are thus 
recursively unified, until this process is stopped because no zone is left, or up to a number 
of zones to be explored when the size of the analysed graphs is too large. Concretely, as 
information is localized in the hierarchy thanks to coherence zones, the second issue 
seldom appears. 
From the information gained after the unification process, we may either generate a 
common ancestor to the two groups of zones, which can be a way of abstracting 
information from experience, or we can create offsprings in the case when we want to 
increase the information known by the system. 
The first case corresponds to the mechanism of learning structures along the temporal 
relations. This provides the system with the possibility of acquiring syntactic knowledge 
from the utterances that he has previously analysed, and more generally, it allows the 
system to memorize temporal sequences or decompositions, such as usual scripts or 
causation schemes, which need not be specially marked, but are naturally expressed 
thanks to coherence zones. The second mode for creating temporal zones corresponds to 
the instanciation of the schemes just mentioned,when the system construes an utterance, 
or simply when he tries to see the consequences of a particular state or event. This 
mechanism is done thanks to attention zones that we presented in section 3.4. These zones 
are predictions for elements that are candidate for instanciation. Such zones remain active 
until they can be replaced by new information coming from inputs or other inferences. 
5. Conclusions. 
We have shown here the main lines of a model for temporal representation, which can 
also be used, through its learning and predicting abilities, as a base for reasoning about 
time. This model is now under implementation in Flavors on a Sun workstation, in order 
to be used in two main applications, namely story understanding and man-machine 
dialogue system. The first results, especially when dealing with time consistency, proved 
the efficiency that comes out from using a reduced set of temporal objects and relations. 
On a methodological point of view, we have tried to show that temporal problems 
could be treated with a cognitive approach, in order to put forward what relations are 
really fondamental when one wants to represent time information. With only inclusion and 
succession, most phenomena have proved to be representable in a natural way. 
The second important thesis that we pointed out is that any system which 
communicates with a human in natural language shall include in one single representation 
linguistic structures and the world objects expressed thorough the user's utterances. This 
could be the base of a revised reflexion about the links between language and thought. 
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8. Appendix. 
In order to prove that no inconsistency may appear inside a triple of zones with our 
method, we produce the exhaustive list of the possible cases. So, let a,b and c be three 
temporal zones, and (rl,r2) a couple of relations, such that: a rl b and b r2 c. We have 
seen (cf Table 4.1) that in five cases, there was an ambiguity, that is, only two relations 
out of four were forbidden between a and c. For each possible situation and for each 
rejected relation, we have put in table 8.1 the transitions that could be done if the relation 
appeared, and the incoherence that would thus be generated, given that only one relation 
can exist between two temporal zones. As a result, we see that our algorithm actually 
ensure that each triple of zones is coherent in relation to temporal succession and 
inclusion. 
Ambiguous transition 
and situation scheme 
Forbidden arc Possible inference Contradiction 
1) a prec b & b in c a prec_i c a prec_i c & c in_i b a prec_i b * a prec b 
rri Nn 
a in_i c a i n j c & c in_i b a in_i b * a prec b 
2) a prec_i b & b in c a prec c 
a in_i c 
a prec c & c in_i b 
a in_i c & c in_i b 
a prec b * a prec_i b 
a in_i b a prec_i b 
3) a in i b & b prec c 
• •  
a prec_i c a prec_i c & c prec_i b a prec_i b * a in_i b 
m m 
a in c b in a & a in c b in c * b prec c 
4) a in i b & b prec i c a prec c a prec c & c prec b a prec b * a in_i b 
rrvnn 
a in c b in a & a in c b in c * b prec_i c 
5) a ini i b & b in c a prec c 
a prec_i c 
b in a & a prec c 
b in a & a prec_i c 
b prec c * b in c 
b prec_i c * b in c 
Table 8.1 
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